返回提示词目录第 1473 页

审计桌面应用安全与发布可靠性

检查渲染进程到系统权限的调用链及打包更新机制,输出含证据分级、修复建议与回归测试的报告。

完整提示词

I want a deep security, reliability and production audit of the Electron application.

Main objective:

> Determine whether the Electron architecture correctly separates the renderer from OS privileges and safely uses IPC, navigation, preload and Node capabilities, and whether the packaging, update and runtime behavior can work reliably in production.

This is not:

- "Electron is insecure"
- automatic criticism of high RAM usage
- insisting that the application be rewritten as native
- only a CSP audit

## 1. ELECTRON VERSION

Current semantics depend on version.

## 2. PROCESS MODEL

- main
- renderer
- preload
- utility
- worker

## 3. BROWSERWINDOW INVENTORY

For each:

```text
Purpose:
URL/content:
webPreferences:
Preload:
Node integration:
Context isolation:
Sandbox:
Navigation:
External content:
```

## 4. NODEINTEGRATION

High-value review.

## 5. CONTEXTISOLATION

## 6. SANDBOX

## 7. PRELOAD

## 8. CONTEXTBRIDGE

## 9. GLOBAL EXPOSURE

Expose narrow APIs.

## 10. IPC MAIN/RENDERER

## 11. IPC CHANNEL INVENTORY

## 12. INPUT SCHEMA

## 13. SENDER VALIDATION

## 14. WINDOW/FRAME IDENTITY

## 15. AUTHORITY

Renderer should not get arbitrary filesystem/process power.

## 16. IPC CONFUSED DEPUTY

## 17. RETURN DATA

Avoid leaking secrets.

## 18. REMOTE CONTENT

## 19. NAVIGATION

## 20. WILL-NAVIGATE

## 21. WINDOW OPEN

## 22. EXTERNAL URL

## 23. SHELL.OPENEXTERNAL

Validate protocol/URL.

## 24. CUSTOM PROTOCOL

## 25. DEEP LINK

## 26. CSP

## 27. XSS TO RCE PATH

Central Electron risk.

## 28. INNERHTML/DOM INJECTION

Only critical if reachable and privileges exist.

## 29. WEBVIEW

## 30. SESSION

## 31. PARTITION

## 32. COOKIES

## 33. TOKEN STORAGE

## 34. DEVTOOLS

## 35. DEBUG PORT

## 36. PRODUCTION FLAGS

## 37. ASAR

Not security boundary by itself.

## 38. NATIVE MODULE

## 39. NODE ABI

## 40. PACKAGING

## 41. CODE SIGNING

## 42. NOTARIZATION

If macOS.

## 43. WINDOWS SIGNING

## 44. LINUX PACKAGES

## 45. AUTOUPDATER

## 46. ELECTRON-UPDATER

If used.

## 47. UPDATE SIGNATURE

## 48. UPDATE CHANNEL

## 49. DOWNGRADE

## 50. ROLLBACK

## 51. APP DATA

## 52. USERDATA PATH

## 53. CACHE

## 54. SESSION STORAGE

## 55. LOCALSTORAGE

Sensitive-data implications.

## 56. INDEXEDDB

## 57. SQLITE

## 58. FILESYSTEM

## 59. DOWNLOAD

## 60. CLIPBOARD

## 61. SCREEN CAPTURE

## 62. GLOBAL SHORTCUT

## 63. TRAY

## 64. NOTIFICATION

## 65. POWER MONITOR

## 66. SLEEP/RESUME

## 67. SINGLE INSTANCE

## 68. CRASH

## 69. RENDERER CRASH

## 70. MAIN PROCESS CRASH

## 71. HANG

## 72. RESPONSIVENESS

## 73. GPU PROCESS

## 74. HARDWARE ACCELERATION

## 75. MEMORY

## 76. RENDERER LEAK

## 77. WINDOW LEAK

## 78. IPC LISTENER LEAK

## 79. BACKGROUND TIMER

## 80. STARTUP

## 81. BUNDLE SIZE

## 82. LAZY LOAD

## 83. NETWORK

## 84. PROXY

## 85. CERTIFICATE

## 86. CERTIFICATE ERROR HANDLER

Dangerous if blindly accepted.

## 87. PERMISSION REQUEST HANDLER

## 88. CAMERA/MIC

## 89. FILE DIALOG

## 90. PATH TRUST

## 91. DRAG/DROP

## 92. EXTENSION

## 93. ELECTRON FUSES

If used, inspect actual configuration.

## 94. DEPENDENCY SUPPLY CHAIN

## 95. NATIVE BINARY

## 96. SOURCE MAP

## 97. CRASH REPORTER

## 98. TELEMETRY

## 99. FALSE POSITIVE RULES

Do not automatically call:

- Electron usage
- preload
- contextBridge
- shell.openExternal
- native module
- auto-update

a defect.

Need reachability and impact.

## 100. EVIDENCE TIERS

```text
A - reproduced runtime/security/release failure
B - complete renderer-to-privilege path
C - strong static evidence
D - plausible issue
E - hardening
```

## 101. STATUS

```text
CONFIRMED
LIKELY
NOT VERIFIED
CONTROLLED
NOT APPLICABLE
HARDENING
```

## 102. SEVERITY

P0:
systemic RCE/updater compromise at scale

P1:
renderer compromise reaches critical OS privilege
critical IPC authorization bypass

P2:
material local security/reliability issue

P3:
limited hardening/performance weakness

P4:
maturity

## 103. FINDING FORMAT

```text
ID:
Severity:
Status:
Evidence tier:
Electron version:
Window/process:
Renderer trust:
IPC/preload API:
Trigger:
Privilege path:
Reachability:
Impact:
Evidence:
Root cause:
Fix:
Regression test:
```

## 104. SECURITY MATRIX

| Window | External content | Node | Isolation | Sandbox | Preload |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

## 105. IPC MATRIX

| Channel | Caller | Args | Privilege | Validation |
|---|---|---|---|---|

## 106. SECOND PASS

Test:

- renderer XSS
- malicious remote page
- arbitrary external URL
- malformed IPC
- forged renderer request
- compromised preload assumption
- updater interruption
- certificate failure
- multiple windows
- renderer crash
- deep link with crafted input

## 107. FINAL QUALITY GATE

Confirm:

- processes
- BrowserWindow
- isolation
- sandbox
- preload
- IPC
- navigation
- external URLs
- permissions
- storage
- update
- signing
- crashes
- memory
- release configuration

## 108. OUTPUT

`ELECTRON_APPLICATION_AUDIT.md`

## 109. FAILURE CHAIN

```text
renderer displays attacker-controlled HTML
↓
XSS executes JavaScript
↓
preload exposes:
window.api.readFile(path)
↓
IPC handler accepts arbitrary path
↓
renderer reads user's SSH key
↓
XSS becomes local file disclosure
```

# FINAL RULE

Electron security is not measured by whether `contextIsolation: true` is set.

You must follow the complete path:

```text
untrusted renderer input
↓
preload
↓
IPC
↓
main-process privilege
↓
OS side effect
```

分类与标签

编程开发、桌面应用审计、进程权限隔离、进程通信、自动更新、发布可靠性

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