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漏洞积压排序与补丁批次规划

结合利用证据、资产暴露和业务影响合并漏洞修复组,输出优先级、补丁批次及限期例外。

完整提示词

<context>
Scanners produce thousands of findings, and CVSS alone is a poor sorting key: many "critical" findings are never exploited, while a medium on an internet-facing system with a public exploit can be the one that matters. Good prioritisation combines four questions: is it being exploited in the wild (a known-exploited catalogue, exploit prediction scores, vendor or intel reports), can an attacker reach it (exposure), what would it cost if exploited (asset value and data), and what mitigates it already. Then it groups the work the way fixes are actually delivered: one upgrade or image rebuild often closes dozens of findings.
</context>

<task>
Prioritise this backlog:

<findings>
{{findings}}
</findings>

<asset_context>
{{asset_context}}
</asset_context>
{{#sla_policy}}

<sla_policy>
{{sla_policy}}
</sla_policy>
{{/sla_policy}}

1. If the findings cannot be tied to assets (no hosts, images or applications), ask for that mapping and stop.
2. Normalise: merge duplicates (same CVE on the same asset from different scanners), flag likely false positives (version detected by banner only, backported patches common on some Linux distributions) and group findings by the fix that resolves them (package upgrade, OS patch level, base image rebuild, configuration change).
3. For each fix group, assess: exploitation evidence (only from the input; if the input does not say whether a CVE is in a known-exploited catalogue or what its exploit prediction score is, write "check" rather than guessing), exposure (internet-facing, internal, isolated), asset criticality, and compensating controls.
4. Assign a priority using a stated decision rule, for example: P0 when known exploited and exposed; P1 when known exploited internally or a public exploit exists and the asset is exposed; P2 for high severity with no exploitation evidence; P3 for the rest. Show the inputs behind each decision.
5. Build patch waves: Wave 0 (emergency, outside normal change windows), then waves aligned to the deadlines in the policy (or a proposed policy marked as such), each with fix groups, asset owners, required downtime or restarts, and verification (rescan, version check).
6. Exceptions: where a fix is not possible soon (vendor has no patch, end-of-life system, change freeze), propose a time-limited exception with compensating controls, an expiry date and an owner.
7. Before answering, check every finding appears in exactly one fix group and that no exploitation claim is made without a source in the input.
</task>

<constraints>
- Never invent CVE details, exploit availability, known-exploited status or scores; mark them "check" and say where to look (the national vulnerability database entry, the known-exploited catalogue, the vendor advisory).
- Prioritise by risk, not by count; say when a single fix group dominates the risk.
- Do not recommend disabling scanning, deleting findings or blanket risk acceptance to make numbers look better.
{{> output/uncertainty}}
</constraints>

<output_format>
## Summary
Three to five sentences: total findings, how many fix groups, what is urgent, and the biggest risk.

## Priority table
Table: Fix group | Findings closed | Assets | Exploitation evidence | Exposure | Criticality | Controls | Priority | Reason.

## Patch waves
One subsection per wave: deadline, fix groups, owners, downtime, verification.

## Exceptions
Table: Item | Why it cannot be fixed now | Compensating controls | Expiry | Owner.

## Data quality issues
Duplicates, likely false positives, assets without owners.

## Assumptions to verify
Bullets, each with where to check.
</output_format>

可替换内容

  • {{findings}}
  • {{asset_context}}
  • {{#sla_policy}}
  • {{sla_policy}}
  • {{/sla_policy}}
  • {{> output/uncertainty}}

分类与标签

编程开发、漏洞管理、补丁计划、资产风险、安全运维、例外管理

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