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排查视窗系统持久化可疑项

审阅主机自启动线索并判断可疑程度,整理只读补查命令、证据清单及需审批的清除方案。

完整提示词

<context>
Windows has dozens of autostart locations, and attackers prefer the ones defenders forget: WMI event subscriptions (`__EventFilter`, `CommandLineEventConsumer`, `__FilterToConsumerBinding`), per-user COM hijacks under `HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID` that override the machine entry, Image File Execution Options `Debugger` values, Winlogon `Userinit` and `Shell`, services with a `ServiceDll` under svchost, and scheduled tasks whose security descriptor was removed so they do not show in Task Scheduler. Autoruns covers most of these when run as administrator with "Hide Microsoft entries" and signature verification. A legitimate updater and a malicious loader can look alike; the useful signals are a binary in a user-writable path (AppData, ProgramData, Temp, Users\Public), an unsigned or mismatched publisher, a LOLBin launcher (`mshta`, `rundll32`, `regsvr32`, `wscript`, `powershell -enc`), a random or lookalike name, and a creation time that fits the incident. Attackers often plant two mechanisms, so removing the first one found is rarely the end.
</context>

<task>
Review these persistence findings:

<findings>
{{findings}}
</findings>
{{#host_context}}

<host_context>
{{host_context}}
</host_context>
{{/host_context}}

1. Check coverage: which autostart categories the findings include (run keys, RunOnce, services and drivers, scheduled tasks, WMI, startup folders, Winlogon, IFEO, AppInit, COM, LSA packages, Office add-ins, browser extensions, BITS jobs) and which are missing.
2. Go through every entry that is not a verified Microsoft or known vendor component, and rate it suspicious, needs checking or likely benign with the specific reason.
3. For suspicious entries, extract the launch command, binary path, signer, hash if given and any URL or IP, defanged (`hxxp`, `[.]`).
4. Give read-only commands to fill the coverage gaps, such as `autorunsc -a * -c -h -s -m` run as administrator, `Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.TaskPath -notlike '\Microsoft\*'}`, `Get-CimInstance -Namespace root\subscription -ClassName __EventFilter` (and the consumer and binding classes), and `Get-ItemProperty` on the relevant keys.
5. List evidence to collect before anything is removed: the binaries and their hashes, the task XML, registry key exports, WMI repository, relevant event logs (7045, 4697, 4698, Sysmon 12 to 14 and 19 to 21 if present) and a triage collection.
6. Write a removal plan only for entries rated suspicious, ordered so the attacker cannot re-create one from another, with a check that each was removed, and a note on whether rebuilding the host is the safer choice.
</task>

<constraints>
- Do not call an entry malicious because it is unsigned or unfamiliar alone; say what would confirm it.
- Do not recommend deleting anything before evidence is collected, and mark removal steps as requiring the incident lead's approval.
- Never invent vendor names or claim a hash is known bad. Suggest a reputation lookup by hash instead.
- If the host had administrator-level compromise, say that cleaning in place may miss persistence and recommend a rebuild decision.
{{> output/uncertainty}}
</constraints>

<output_format>
## Coverage check
Covered and missing autostart categories.

## Suspicious entries
Table: Location | Entry | Launch command | Signer | Why suspicious | Confidence.

## Likely benign
Short table of entries reviewed and why they look normal.

## Commands to fill gaps
Fenced `powershell` block, read-only commands only.

## Evidence to collect
Checklist.

## Removal plan
Ordered steps with verification, labelled "after approval", plus the rebuild recommendation.
</output_format>

可替换内容

  • {{findings}}
  • {{#host_context}}
  • {{host_context}}
  • {{/host_context}}
  • {{> output/uncertainty}}
  • [.]

分类与标签

编程开发、主机安全、持久化排查、事件响应、证据采集、只读命令

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