安全事件取证时间线构建
整理日志等取证材料,统一时间并关联攻击活动,输出附来源与置信说明的时间线和证据缺口。
完整提示词
<context>
A forensic timeline turns scattered artefacts into an account of what the attacker did, when, and with which access. The common errors are mixing time zones (one source in local time, another in UTC, so the "first" event is an hour off), trusting a single timestamp that can be altered (file system created times can be timestomped), filling gaps with assumptions, and labelling every unusual event as malicious. Investigators, lawyers and insurers may rely on this timeline later, so every row must cite its source, and every classification must say how sure it is.
</context>
<task>
Build a timeline for this scope: {{scope}}
<artefacts>
{{artefacts}}
</artefacts>
{{#timezone_notes}}
<timezone_notes>
{{timezone_notes}}
</timezone_notes>
{{/timezone_notes}}
1. If the artefacts lack timestamps or sources, or the scope is missing, say what is needed and stop.
2. Clock notes: for each source, state the timezone you assume and why (from the notes, from the format, or unknown), the precision, and known caveats. Typical caveats: Windows event logs stored in UTC but often exported in the viewer's local time; FAT and some archive timestamps in local time with two-second precision; syslog lines without a year or zone; browser and application timestamps in different epochs; NTFS `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` times that can be altered while `$FILE_NAME` times usually are not. If a source's zone is unknown, keep it in a separate column and do not merge it silently.
3. Normalise every timestamp to {{output_timezone}} in ISO 8601 and sort.
4. Correlate: group events that describe the same action across sources (a logon event, a process start and a network connection within seconds from the same account), and mark the pivot points such as first attacker access, privilege change, lateral movement, persistence, data access and exfiltration.
5. Classify each row: attacker activity (confirmed by direct evidence), suspicious (consistent with the attack but with an innocent explanation possible), normal, or unknown. Give the reason in a few words and an ATT&CK tactic where it applies.
6. Write the narrative of the attack in phases, citing row numbers, and keep confirmed and inferred steps apart.
7. List evidence gaps: periods with no data, sources that rolled over or were cleared (a cleared log is itself evidence), and hosts or accounts in scope with no artefacts.
8. Before answering, check that no row was dropped or duplicated, that every row has a source, and that the narrative cites only rows that exist.
</task>
<constraints>
- Never invent events or fill a gap with what "probably happened"; write the gap.
- Distinguish absence of evidence from evidence of absence: no log entry may mean no logging.
- Work only from the artefacts provided; recommend that analysis is done on verified copies with hashes recorded, not on original evidence.
- Do not name a threat actor; attribution is out of scope.
{{> output/uncertainty}}
</constraints>
<output_format>
## Scope and assumptions
Bullets.
## Clock notes
Table: Source | Assumed timezone | Basis | Precision | Caveats.
## Timeline
Table: # | Time ({{output_timezone}}) | Source | Host | Account | Event | Classification | Tactic | Note.
## Attack narrative
Phases with row references; inferred steps marked "(inferred)".
## Evidence gaps
Bullets with the time range or source and why it matters.
## Next artefacts
Numbered list of what to collect next and the question each would answer.
</output_format>可替换内容
- {{scope}}
- {{artefacts}}
- {{#timezone_notes}}
- {{timezone_notes}}
- {{/timezone_notes}}
- {{output_timezone}}
- {{> output/uncertainty}}
分类与标签
编程开发、安全取证、事件响应、日志关联、攻击时间线