Vercel生产部署安全与可靠性审计
检查部署环境、密钥隔离、缓存与回滚链路,形成附证据分级、风险矩阵及修复措施的生产审计报告。
完整提示词
I want a deep production audit of the Vercel deployment and Next.js/serverless/edge infrastructure. If the project does not use Vercel: **NOT APPLICABLE** ## 1. OBJECTIVE AND NON-GOALS Prove whether the Vercel setup keeps **secrets and private data inside their intended environment and audience**, whether **what runs in production is the intended, tested deployment**, and whether the serverless and caching model **holds under real traffic, failure and rollback**. Non-goals: - general application security review (only where Vercel or Next.js platform semantics change the answer) - performance tuning of individual pages unless it causes cost, availability or data exposure - recommending migration away from Vercel or from serverless - generic CI/CD review outside Vercel's deployment model ## 2. CONTEXT DISCOVERY Establish first, from the repository and the project settings: ```text Framework and exact version (Next.js major/minor, App Router, Pages Router, or both): Rendering modes in use (static, dynamic, ISR, streaming, server actions): Runtimes per route (Node.js, Edge) and middleware location: Vercel plan and enabled features (deployment protection, firewall, cron, storage): Data stores and their regions; pooling or serverless drivers: Git integration: production branch, fork PR behavior, ignored build step: Other deployment paths (CLI, deploy hooks, CI with tokens): ``` Next.js caching defaults, runtime capabilities, function limits, pricing and quotas differ between versions and plans and change over time. Verify current provider and version-specific behavior before stating it; do not rely on remembered defaults. ## 3. EVIDENCE MODEL ```text A - observed: deployment, response headers, logs, a safe preview test or a two-user cache test shows the behavior B - complete path: project settings, env scopes and code fully show the path C - strong static evidence: code or configuration suggests the path, but dashboard settings are not visible D - inference: depends on platform or framework semantics not verified for this version E - hardening: stronger control without a current failure path ``` ## 4. FINDING STATUS - **CONFIRMED** - tier A or B evidence shows the exposure or failure path. - **LIKELY** - tier C evidence. - **NOT VERIFIED** - depends on dashboard settings, plan features or version semantics that could not be checked (tier D). - **NOT APPLICABLE** - the feature is not used. - **CONTROLLED** - the risk exists but another control contains it (for example deployment protection on previews). - **HARDENING** - improvement without a current failure path (P4). Do not report a missing best practice as a confirmed defect unless there is a concrete exposure, correctness, reliability, cost or operational failure path. ## 5. FALSE-POSITIVE RULES The following are **not** findings by themselves: - Using serverless functions, or having cold starts, is not a defect; it becomes one when it breaks a correctness, capacity or latency requirement. - A preview deployment existing is not an exposure; it becomes one when it holds production secrets or data, or exposes unreleased confidential content to people who should not see it. - A `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` variable holding a value designed to be public (publishable keys, public URLs, analytics IDs) is not a leak. - Static generation or caching of a route is correct when the output does not depend on the user, tenant or authorization. - A public cron URL is acceptable when the invocation is authenticated and the job is idempotent. - Source maps are a hardening item unless they reveal secrets or materially sensitive logic. ## 6. MAP VERCEL - Project - Production domain - Preview domains - Git integration - Framework - Build settings - Functions - Edge Functions - Cron - KV/Blob/Postgres integrations - env vars - regions ## 7. PRODUCTION BRANCH Which branch deploys to production? ## 8. PREVIEW Every PR/branch can trigger a live deployment. Ask what secrets it receives. ## 9. ENV SCOPE For each env: ```text Development Preview Production ``` verify variable scope. ## 10. PRODUCTION SECRET IN PREVIEW High-risk if untrusted PR code can read it. ## 11. UNTRUSTED BUILD WITH SECRETS A preview build executes code from the branch: `next.config`, build scripts, dependency install scripts and any module imported during build. - Who can create a branch or PR that triggers a Vercel build (team members, outside contributors, forks)? - Which environment variables does that build receive (Preview scope, and any variable marked for all environments)? - Does the build or the resulting preview runtime reach production data stores? Contributor-controlled code plus production credentials is the critical combination; the fix is scoping, not trust in the contributor. ## 12. PUBLIC ENV Next.js NEXT_PUBLIC_* variables are exposed to the browser. ## 13. SERVER-ONLY ENV Verify the import boundary. ## 14. PUBLIC ENV LEAKAGE `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` values are inlined into the client bundle at build time; renaming a secret with that prefix publishes it. Also check indirect paths: - server values passed as props to client components - server values serialized into page data or RSC payloads - `env` entries in `next.config` that are inlined - error pages and logs rendered to the client Verify by searching the built client assets for known secret prefixes and values when a build is available. ## 15. BUILD-TIME SECRET Can be inadvertently embedded into generated assets. ## 16. BUILD-TIME VS RUNTIME ENVIRONMENT For each variable, determine when it is read: - **build time** - value baked into static pages, the client bundle or generated files; changing it requires a new build - **runtime** - value read by functions on each invocation Findings to look for: a variable changed in the dashboard but still baked into an old build, a statically generated page containing a secret read at build time, and a promotion or rollback that runs code built with a different value than expected. Verify how the current platform version applies environment changes to existing deployments. ## 17. FUNCTION RUNTIME Node vs Edge. ## 18. EDGE LIMITATIONS - filesystem - TCP - packages - runtime APIs ## 19. EDGE VS NODE.JS RUNTIME For every route, middleware and function on the Edge runtime, confirm that its dependencies actually work there: database drivers, crypto and JWT libraries, SDKs that expect Node.js APIs. Failures to look for: - a library silently falling back to weaker behavior (for example no signature verification) - a code path that only fails at runtime on a rarely used branch - a database accessed from Edge regions far from the data Runtime capabilities of middleware and Edge functions change between framework and platform versions; verify for the detected version. ## 20. REGION Function region vs database region. ## 21. CROSS-REGION LATENCY DB calls originating from a distant region. ## 22. SERVERLESS DB CONNECTIONS Bursting functions can exhaust the database connection pool. ## 23. POOLING Verify connection provider/proxy. ## 24. SERVERLESS DATABASE MODEL Estimate worst-case connections: ```text concurrent function instances x connections per instance (pool size) = demand demand vs database max connections (minus reserved and other clients) ``` Check: - pool size per instance (a pool of 10 per instance multiplies quickly) - whether a pooler, proxy or HTTP-based driver sits in front of the database, and its mode (session vs transaction pooling and what that breaks: prepared statements, session settings, advisory locks) - connection reuse across warm invocations vs a new connection per request - cold-start connect time and TLS handshakes to a distant region - burst behavior: a traffic spike or retry storm creating many instances at once - function region vs database region ## 25. FUNCTION TIMEOUT Long-running tasks. ## 26. BACKGROUND WORK Do not rely on function execution continuing post-response unless platform semantics explicitly guarantee it. ## 27. CRON Audit: - auth - duplicate runs - duration - retries - idempotency ## 28. CRON URL If public endpoint: must enforce strong invocation controls if the underlying action is privileged. ## 29. CRON SEMANTICS For each scheduled job: - **invocation authentication** - the endpoint verifies a secret the platform sends, not just a hard-to-guess path - **duplicate or missed runs** - assume a run can be delivered more than once or skipped; the job must be idempotent and tolerate gaps - **overlap** - a run longer than the interval can overlap the next one; is there a lock or a guard? - **timeouts** - a job killed at the function limit must leave consistent state and resume correctly - **environment** - which deployments execute cron (production only?), and what happens after a rollback or promotion Verify the current cron delivery guarantees and limits for the plan in use. ## 30. BUILD OUTPUT Verify what enters the static bundle. ## 31. SOURCE MAPS Public exposure. ## 32. STATIC FILE Accidental inclusion of .env, backups, or internal JSON. ## 33. NEXT.JS ROUTE HANDLERS Runtime configuration. ## 34. SERVER ACTIONS Auth and authorization enforcement. ## 35. MIDDLEWARE Edge middleware is not the sole security layer for backend resource authorization. ## 36. CACHING Next.js: - static - dynamic - revalidate - fetch cache - route cache ## 37. PRIVATE DATA CACHE Most critical scenario: ```text User A response ↓ cached without user/tenant key ↓ User B receives it ``` ## 38. STATIC GENERATION Sensitive per-user routes must never be statically generated. ## 39. REVALIDATION Stale private data exposure. ## 40. CDN CACHE Cache-Control headers. ## 41. Vary Relevant request dimensions. ## 42. ISR Public content consistency. ## 43. AUTH COOKIE + CACHE Ensure that authentication-dependent rendering truly remains dynamic/private. ## 44. NEXT.JS CACHING MODEL Identify the caching layers for the detected Next.js version and router, and for each one determine whether it can hold user-, tenant- or authorization-dependent data: ```text Request memoization: per request, deduplicates identical fetches Data Cache: persistent fetch/function results across requests and deployments Full Route Cache: rendered output of static routes Client Router Cache: RSC payloads kept in the browser session CDN / edge cache: responses cached by Cache-Control and platform rules ``` For each route that reads the session, cookies, headers or tenant: - does it render dynamically, or can it be statically generated and served to everyone? - is any cached fetch or cached function keyed without user or tenant identity? - can revalidation (time-based, tag or path) serve stale private data after a permission change? - can a response with `Set-Cookie` or private data be cached by the CDN? Default caching behavior has changed between Next.js major versions; confirm the defaults and opt-in/opt-out APIs for the detected version instead of assuming. Confirm exposure with a two-user test (A then B, and different tenants). ## 45. IMAGE OPTIMIZATION Remote image patterns can introduce SSRF-like/proxy/cost attack surfaces per Next/Vercel semantics. ## 46. REMOTE PATTERNS Do not allow arbitrary wildcard hosts. ## 47. IMAGE COST ABUSE Enormous or repeated remote image requests. ## 48. REWRITES Can accidentally expose internal backends. ## 49. PROXY Server-side rewrites can bypass expected security boundaries. ## 50. INTERNAL SERVICE EXPOSURE For every rewrite, proxy route and server-side fetch built from request input: - which destinations are reachable (internal APIs, admin backends, metadata or private hosts)? - can path or query parameters change the destination host or path (`/api/proxy/:path*` to an internal API)? - which headers are forwarded (cookies, authorization) and which are added (internal tokens)? - does the destination trust the request because it comes from the Vercel deployment? A rewrite to an internal service is an exposed endpoint with that service's authorization model. ## 51. REDIRECTS Open redirect logic in application configuration. ## 52. HEADERS Security, caching, and CORS headers. ## 53. CUSTOM DOMAIN DNS ownership and verification. ## 54. DANGLING VERCEL DOMAIN Orphaned project-to-custom-domain mappings. ## 55. PREVIEW URL Can inadvertently expose unreleased features or confidential data. ## 56. PREVIEW AUTH If preview requires restricted access, verify deployment protection. ## 57. PREVIEW PROTECTION - Which deployments are protected (previews only, all generated URLs, production aliases)? - Can protection be bypassed by automation tokens or shareable links, and who holds them? - Do previews connect to production data, send real emails or payments, or call production webhooks? - Are preview URLs indexed by search engines or linked from public places? ## 58. DEPLOY HOOK A secret URL triggering deployment is an authorization capability. ## 59. GIT DEPLOY Which Git actor has authority to trigger production? ## 60. DIRECT CLI DEPLOY Who holds Vercel tokens or direct project access? ## 61. VERCEL TOKEN Scope and exposure within CI. ## 62. TEAM ACCESS Production management privileges. ## 63. ENV VAR AUDIT - missing - duplicates - stale - preview leakage - public prefix misuse ## 64. VERCEL INTEGRATION Third-party integration permissions. ## 65. BLOB/STORAGE Public vs private access controls. ## 66. POSTGRES Connection pooling, region alignment, and backups. ## 67. KV/CACHE Authoritative data vs disposable cache. ## 68. EDGE CONFIG Propagation latency and staleness. ## 69. LOGS Function logs can inadvertently leak secrets. ## 70. OBSERVABILITY Cold starts, error rates, and invocation durations. ## 71. FUNCTION CONCURRENCY Serverless concurrency amplification. ## 72. PROVIDER QUOTA Functions, builds, bandwidth, and image optimization limits. ## 73. BUILD MINUTES Abuse and unexpected costs. ## 74. BANDWIDTH Large egress downloads. ## 75. BOT/ATTACK TRAFFIC Incurred costs prior to application rate limiting. ## 76. COST AMPLIFICATION Identify request paths where one cheap external request causes expensive platform usage: uncached dynamic rendering, image optimization of arbitrary sources, large downloads served through functions, long-running functions, or retries. Check spend limits, alerts and caps, and verify the current pricing model and quotas for the plan; do not quote remembered limits or prices. ## 77. FIREWALL/WAF If Vercel security features are enabled, do not treat them as substitutes for application controls. ## 78. ROLLBACK Vercel can redeploy/promote previous deployments, but verify database/config compatibility. ## 79. ROLLBACK REALITY Rolling back to a previous deployment restores code, not the world around it. For each rollback path, determine: - does the old deployment work with the **current database schema** and data written by the newer version? - which **environment variable values** does it run with (its own build-time values, current runtime values)? Verify for the platform version. - do **cron schedules, rewrites and headers** revert with it? - do clients with a newer cached bundle or service worker break against the older API? A rollback that cannot be performed safely during an incident is not a rollback plan. ## 80. IMMUTABLE DEPLOY Deployment URL acts as a distinct artifact identity. ## 81. PROMOTION If workflow promotes preview to production, verify that the exact tested deployment is promoted. ## 82. REBUILD If production rebuilds from source, parity risks emerge. ## 83. DEPLOYMENT IDENTITY Each deployment is an immutable build with its own URL; production is an alias pointing at one of them. Determine: - Is production created by **promoting** an already-tested deployment, or by a **new build** from the production branch? - If rebuilt, can inputs differ from what was tested (environment values, dependency resolution, build cache)? - Which commit and which deployment are serving the production domain right now, and can that be traced? - Can someone assign the production domain to an arbitrary deployment, and is that audited? ## 84. BUILD CACHE Stale generated build outputs. ## 85. MONOREPO Root directory and build ignore settings. ## 86. ignoreCommand Can inadvertently skip required deployments. ## 87. DEPLOY ORDER Frontend/backend combined in the same Next app vs decoupled external APIs. ## 88. PWA Stale service workers and caches persisting after Vercel deployment. ## 89. ENV ROLLBACK Does an older deployment run against current environment variables or snapshot semantics? Confirm actual behavior; do not guess. ## 90. DATABASE MIGRATION Never tie unsafe database migrations to serverless function cold starts. ## 91. MIGRATION JOB Execute as a dedicated, controlled step. ## 92. SEED Ensure production database seeds are never accidentally reset. ## 93. SERVERLESS FILESYSTEM Ephemeral nature of storage. ## 94. UPLOADS Do not persist durable user uploads locally in the function filesystem. ## 95. /tmp Temporary usage only. ## 96. RESPONSE SIZE Platform payload limits. ## 97. REQUEST SIZE Upload payload limits. ## 98. STREAMING Runtime and platform streaming limits. ## 99. WEBSOCKET Verify current architecture support and operational models; do not assume. ## 100. LONG CONNECTION Server-sent events (SSE) and long-lived streams. ## 101. THIRD-PARTY BACKEND Rewrites and reverse proxies. ## 102. MANDATORY FAILURE WALKTHROUGH For each scenario, state the current behavior, the resulting state, how it is detected and how it is recovered: ```text preview build from an untrusted branch receives a production secret secret is exposed through NEXT_PUBLIC or a statically generated page private route response is cached and served to another user or tenant traffic burst creates a database connection storm long function is killed at the platform limit mid-write cron runs twice, overlaps or is skipped durable file written to the function filesystem disappears after redeploy rollback runs an older deployment against a newer schema public Blob or storage object exposes private data production branch or domain assignment is misconfigured ``` ## 103. MATRICES ### Environment Matrix | Variable / resource | Development | Preview | Production | Read at build or runtime | Exposed to client | Risk | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ### Function / Runtime Matrix | Route or function | Runtime | Region | Data store and region | Max duration need | Connections per instance | Auth | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ### Cache / Data Sensitivity Matrix | Route or fetch | Depends on user/tenant | Rendering mode | Cache layers involved | Cache key includes identity | Revalidation | Verified by test | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ## 104. FINDING FORMAT ```text ID: Severity: Status: Evidence tier: Vercel surface: Environment: Runtime: Region: Scope (routes, functions, deployments): Trigger: Current config / behavior: Expected invariant: Failure / exploit path: Impact: Blast radius: Evidence: Root cause: Remediation: Verification: Regression risk: Complexity: ``` ## 105. SEVERITY - **P0** - production secrets reachable by untrusted code or the public, or private data of one user or tenant served to another. - **P1** - unauthorized production deployment path, privileged cron or proxy endpoint callable without authentication, or a routine event (traffic burst, rollback) that causes an outage or data corruption. - **P2** - material reliability or cost gaps: connection exhaustion risk under realistic peaks, non-idempotent cron, unsafe rollback, cost amplification without limits. - **P3** - limited issues: stale public content, minor preview exposure of non-confidential content, missing observability. - **P4** - hardening: tighter scopes, source map removal, additional protection where no current path exists. ## 106. OUTPUT VERCEL_PRODUCTION_AUDIT.md ## 107. SECOND PASS Test or analyze: - a new preview from an untrusted branch: exactly which env values reach its build and runtime - user A, then user B (and tenant A, then tenant B) on every personalized route; compare responses and cache headers - a function burst against the database: instances x pool size vs the connection limit - a function reaching its timeout during a write - two cron invocations in parallel - rollback to the previous deployment against the current schema and env - a secret scan of the static output and client bundle - a durable file written before a redeploy - a custom domain or DNS failure Then try to disprove each finding: does deployment protection, env scoping, dynamic rendering or an upstream check already block the path for the detected version? Mark findings that depend on unverified platform semantics as **NOT VERIFIED**. ## 108. FINAL QUALITY GATE Before returning the report, verify that it covers: - framework version and the caching semantics verified for it - production branch, deployment identity and promotion vs rebuild - previews: who can trigger them, which secrets and data they reach, protection - env scopes per environment and build-time vs runtime reads - public bundle and `NEXT_PUBLIC` usage - caching of every user- or tenant-dependent route, with a two-user test where possible - runtime choice, region alignment and database connection math - function limits, background work and ephemeral filesystem assumptions - cron authentication, idempotency and overlap - rewrites and proxies to internal services - storage access (Blob, KV, Postgres) and backups - rollback against current schema, env and clients - Git, CLI, token and deploy hook authority - logs and secrets, observability - quotas and cost amplification, verified for the current plan - consistent statuses and evidence tiers # FINAL RULE Looking for issues such as: ```text Preview environment ↓ inherits PRODUCTION_DATABASE_URL ↓ external contributor opens PR ↓ Vercel builds contributor-controlled Next.js code ↓ build script reads env ↓ production database credential can be exfiltrated ``` or: ```text server component fetch: cache enabled ↓ response depends on authenticated tenant ↓ cache key does not include tenant identity ↓ Tenant B receives Tenant A data ``` Other failure chains to look for: ```text cron job charges pending renewals ↓ invocation is delivered twice, or a slow run overlaps the next schedule ↓ no idempotency key or lock ↓ both runs select the same pending rows ↓ customers are charged twice ``` ```text release adds a NOT NULL column and writes new-format records ↓ incident triggers instant rollback to the previous deployment ↓ old code inserts without the new column and cannot parse the new records ↓ writes fail and reads crash on rows created in the last hour ```
分类与标签
编程开发、生产部署审计、预览环境隔离、私有数据缓存、部署回滚