审查身份认证流程安全风险
检查令牌、会话、密码恢复与多因素认证,依据具体攻击路径输出分级漏洞、修复措施和待确认项。
完整提示词
<context>
Authentication bugs are rarely in the cryptography. They are in the glue: a redirect URI matched by prefix, an ID token accepted without checking its audience, a refresh token that never rotates, a password reset link built from the Host header, MFA enforced on the login form but not on the API or the recovery path. Each has a well-known attack. The review must find these with a concrete path from attacker to account takeover, not list every best practice.
</context>
<task>
Review this authentication design for a {{app_type}} application:
{{design_or_code}}
Check each area that the material covers:
1. OAuth and OIDC: authorization code flow with PKCE for public clients (no implicit flow), `state` and `nonce` validated, exact redirect URI matching, ID token validation (signature, `iss`, `aud`, `exp`, allowed algorithms only), ID tokens never used as API access tokens, access tokens checked for audience, account linking only on verified email.
2. Tokens: short access-token lifetimes, refresh-token rotation with reuse detection, a revocation strategy for stateless tokens, no sensitive data in JWT claims, `kid` and `alg` handling that cannot be steered by the attacker.
3. Storage by client type: for a SPA, no long-lived tokens in localStorage (prefer a backend-for-frontend with HttpOnly cookies); for mobile, the platform keystore, the system browser rather than an embedded web view, and claimed HTTPS redirect URIs; for an API, scoped, hashed and rotatable keys.
4. Sessions and cookies: new session ID on login and privilege change, `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite` and the `__Host-` prefix, idle and absolute timeouts, server-side invalidation on logout and password change, CSRF protection for cookie-authenticated state changes.
5. Passwords: a slow, salted hash (Argon2id, scrypt or bcrypt) with sound parameters, breached-password checks, rate limiting and credential-stuffing defences, no account enumeration through messages or timing.
6. Reset and recovery: single-use, short-lived, high-entropy tokens stored hashed; links built from configuration, not the Host header; existing sessions revoked after reset; recovery paths no weaker than login.
7. MFA: enforced server-side on every path (API, legacy endpoints, recovery), OTP attempts rate-limited, recovery codes, protection against push-fatigue, phishing-resistant options for high-value accounts.
Report a finding only when you can describe the attack path: who the attacker is, what they do step by step, and what they gain.
</task>
<constraints>
- Quote the line, setting or diagram step each finding is about. If a decision is not shown, ask about it under Questions instead of assuming it is wrong.
- Rank by impact: account takeover and token theft first, hardening last.
- Reference OWASP ASVS by chapter name where relevant; do not invent requirement numbers.
{{> guardrails/investigate-before-answering}}
</constraints>
<output_format>
## Verdict
One line: ship | ship after fixes | redesign needed. Then one sentence why.
## Findings
Numbered. Each: severity, location, the attack path in steps, the impact, and the fix.
## Verified safe
Bullets of areas you checked and found sound.
## Questions
Decisions the material does not show that change the risk.
</output_format>可替换内容
- {{app_type}}
- {{design_or_code}}
- {{> guardrails/investigate-before-answering}}
分类与标签
编程开发、认证安全、令牌管理、会话安全、多因素认证、安全代码审查