代码仓库自动化工作流安全审计
追踪工作流触发器、权限与不可信输入,识别密钥泄露和越权部署链路,形成证据化审计报告。
完整提示词
I want a complete forensic audit of all GitHub Actions workflows with a focus on supply chain, secrets, permissions, untrusted pull requests, deployment authority, and expression/script injection.
Main objective:
> Determine whether a contributor, compromised dependency/action, malicious PR, tag, branch, or workflow input can lead to secrets theft, repository write access, package publishing, release tampering, or unauthorized production deployments.
## 1. INVENTORY
All:
```text
.github/workflows/*.yml
.github/actions/*
```
plus reusable workflows.
For each workflow:
```text
Name:
Triggers:
Permissions:
Secrets:
Environment:
Runner:
External actions:
Deployment:
Artifacts:
```
## 2. TRIGGERS
Review:
- push
- pull_request
- pull_request_target
- workflow_dispatch
- workflow_run
- schedule
- release
- issue_comment
- repository_dispatch
## 3. `pull_request`
Code originating from forks is untrusted.
Verify GitHub secret exposure semantics against the actual event trigger.
## 4. `pull_request_target`
High-value attack surface.
The workflow executes in the context of the base repository and can access elevated privileges.
## 5. DANGEROUS COMBINATION
```text
pull_request_target
+
checkout PR head
+
execute code
+
secrets/write token
```
P0/P1 candidate.
## 6. CHECKOUT REF
Identify precisely what commit SHA is checked out:
- base SHA
- merge commit
- head SHA
- arbitrary user input
## 7. `workflow_run`
A privileged follow-up workflow can process artifacts generated by an untrusted workflow.
## 8. ARTIFACT TRUST
An artifact is not inherently trusted merely because it originates from another workflow.
## 9. ARTIFACT POISONING
Untrusted build artifact -> privileged workflow executes the included file or script.
## 10. `workflow_dispatch`
Audit inputs.
## 11. USER-CONTROLLED EXPRESSION IN SHELL
High-signal:
```yaml
run: echo "${{ github.event.issue.title }}"
```
If content can contain shell syntax and string interpolation injects directly into the generated script.
## 12. SAFE ENV INDIRECTION
Prefer passing untrusted expressions into environment variables, then applying language-appropriate shell quoting.
## 13. PR TITLE/BODY/BRANCH
Attacker-controlled inputs.
## 14. ISSUE COMMENT
Attacker-controlled subject to repository permission settings.
## 15. COMMIT MESSAGE
Potential attacker input.
## 16. MATRIX
Matrix values derived from dynamic JSON can influence commands and runner selections.
## 17. PERMISSIONS
Review top-level and job-level:
```yaml
permissions:
```
## 18. DEFAULT TOKEN
Do not presume token permissions.
Determine the actual declared or default repository context.
## 19. `contents: write`
Analyze why it is required.
## 20. `actions: write`
Can modify or trigger workflow states.
## 21. `packages: write`
Direct supply-chain impact.
## 22. `id-token: write`
OIDC cloud authentication.
Extremely high-value permission.
## 23. `pull-requests: write`
Lower direct impact, but useful for attacker persistence and social engineering vectors.
## 24. MINIMAL PER JOB
Deploy permissions must not be granted to build or test jobs.
## 25. SECRETS
Inventory names only, never secret values.
## 26. SECRET SCOPE
Which job and step receives:
- deploy token
- registry token
- signing key
- cloud credential
## 27. ENVIRONMENT SECRETS
Production environment protection rules.
## 28. APPROVAL
If the workflow deploys to production:
verify environment reviewers and protection rules if accessible.
## 29. OIDC
If the cloud provider supports OIDC:
analyze subject, audience, repository, and branch trust bindings.
## 30. STATIC CLOUD SECRET
Not automatically a flaw, but long-lived credentials carry a larger blast radius.
## 31. OIDC TRUST POLICY
Critical:
> Which repository, workflow, branch/tag, or environment can assume the cloud role?
## 32. WILDCARD SUBJECT
Can permit untrusted branches or PRs to assume production roles.
## 33. THIRD-PARTY ACTION
Every:
```text
uses: owner/action@ref
```
is an executable third-party dependency.
## 34. SHA PINNING
Strong immutability assurance.
## 35. MAJOR TAG
`@v4` can be mutable.
P4/P2 depending on secrets and token permissions.
## 36. `@main`
High-risk for privileged workflows.
## 37. DOCKER ACTION
Can execute arbitrary container code.
## 38. JS ACTION
Likewise.
## 39. COMPOSITE ACTION
Can invoke shell commands and additional actions.
## 40. REUSABLE WORKFLOW
External repository and ref trust boundaries.
## 41. ACTION OWNER
Compromise of the upstream action owner can pivot directly into your CI environment.
## 42. `curl | bash`
High-value attack surface.
## 43. REMOTE BINARY DOWNLOAD
Must enforce version pinning plus checksum or cryptographic signature verification.
## 44. SETUP ACTIONS
Pin compiler and toolchain versions.
## 45. DEPENDENCY INSTALL
Package lifecycle scripts execute inside the CI runner.
## 46. SECRETS BEFORE INSTALL
If secrets are already present in the environment prior to untrusted dependency installation:
risk escalates sharply.
## 47. `npm install` PR
A malicious contributor can alter package lifecycle scripts.
## 48. BUILD SCRIPT
Repository code is executable code.
## 49. SELF-HOSTED RUNNER
Critical trust boundary.
## 50. PUBLIC REPO + SELF-HOSTED
Executing untrusted pull requests is extremely high-risk.
## 51. RUNNER PERSISTENCE
A self-hosted runner can retain:
- files
- credentials
- Docker daemon state
- orphaned processes
from prior jobs.
## 52. EPHEMERAL RUNNER
Mitigates persistence across executions.
## 53. RUNNER LABEL
Can an untrusted workflow target a privileged runner?
## 54. NETWORK ACCESS
A runner may possess access to internal private infrastructure.
## 55. DOCKER SOCKET
A CI runner with access to the Docker socket holds high host privilege.
## 56. GITHUB-HOSTED
The ephemeral model mitigates host persistence, but secrets and token permissions remain crucial.
## 57. CACHE
A cache created by an untrusted branch can subsequently poison a privileged job.
## 58. CACHE POISONING
Review cache key and restore key matching breadth.
## 59. DEPENDENCY CACHE
Does not execute on its own, but can return attacker-modified files if the workflow trusts the cache blindly.
## 60. BUILD ARTIFACT
Integrity and trust boundaries between jobs and workflows.
## 61. ARTIFACT NAME COLLISION
A privileged workflow can download an incorrect or poisoned artifact.
## 62. RELEASE
Who has authority to trigger release workflows?
## 63. TAG-BASED RELEASE
Can an attacker create or push to a release tag ref?
## 64. TAG PROTECTION
If the repository operational model utilizes tag protection rules.
## 65. PACKAGE PUBLISH
NPM, PyPI, or container registry publications.
## 66. VERSION SOURCE
Is the published package version or name attacker-controlled?
## 67. RELEASE ASSET
Can a privileged job upload an attacker-supplied binary?
## 68. SIGNING
Which workflow accesses the code signing key?
## 69. SIGN UNTRUSTED ARTIFACT
Critical scenario:
```text
untrusted build
↓
artifact
↓
privileged signer
```
## 70. DEPLOY
Which exact job possesses production deployment authority?
## 71. DEPLOY REF
Does it deploy from:
- main
- tag
- arbitrary SHA/input
## 72. MANUAL INPUT SHA
workflow_dispatch inputs can allow an operator to deploy arbitrary commits. May be intentional, but audit access.
## 73. ENVIRONMENT URL
Not a security control.
## 74. CONCURRENCY
Production deployment workflows must prevent concurrent runs where race conditions create state corruption.
## 75. CANCEL-IN-PROGRESS
Can abort database migrations or deployments midway.
## 76. MIGRATIONS
Does the workflow run database migrations?
## 77. RETRY
Re-running GitHub Actions can repeat non-idempotent deployment or migration steps.
## 78. MANUAL RERUN
Do not assume reruns are safe.
## 79. OUTPUTS
Secrets can leak via:
- job outputs
- logs
- artifacts
## 80. MASKING
Transformed or base64-encoded secrets might not be masked in logs.
## 81. `set -x`
Can leak secrets into shell debug output.
## 82. `printenv`
Environment variable secret dump.
## 83. ERROR COMMAND
Error output may expose credentials embedded in CLI command arguments.
## 84. STEP SUMMARY
Do not write credentials into GitHub step summaries.
## 85. PR COMMENT
Workflows can inadvertently post secret tokens into public PR comments.
## 86. SARIF/REPORT
Generated vulnerability scanner reports may contain sensitive file paths or data.
## 87. PATH FILTER
Workflow security should not rely on filters that an attacker can bypass by renaming files.
## 88. BRANCH FILTER
Carefully verify branch filtering patterns.
## 89. TAG FILTER
Glob pattern semantics.
## 90. CONDITION
Complex `if:` expressions can harbor subtle logic bugs.
## 91. FORK DETECTION
Do not rely on incorrect context fields.
## 92. ACTOR VS TRIGGERING_ACTOR
Re-run semantics can alter trust evaluation.
## 93. BOT
Dependabot token and secret access restrictions.
## 94. SCHEDULE
Executes with the current default branch workflow file, not necessarily the version from a release tag.
## 95. REPOSITORY_DISPATCH
Who holds a token capable of triggering the dispatch event?
## 96. ISSUE_COMMENT DEPLOY
Comments such as `/deploy` must enforce strict actor permission validation.
## 97. ASSOCIATION
`author_association` can aid validation, but requires understanding permission semantics.
## 98. APPROVAL BOT
Do not treat automated bots as inherently trusted if an untrusted user can control their input triggers.
## 99. COMMIT PINNING
For high-privilege third-party actions, recommend full commit SHA pinning where practical.
## 100. FINDING FORMAT
```text
ID:
Severity:
Status:
Evidence tier:
Workflow:
Trigger:
Job:
Step:
Runner:
Permissions:
Secrets:
Untrusted input:
Execution path:
Impact:
Blast radius:
Evidence:
Fix:
Regression check:
Complexity:
```
## 101. EVIDENCE
```text
A - reproduced in safe repo/test
B - complete workflow execution path
C - strong YAML/config evidence
D - inferred
E - hardening
```
## 102. STATUS AND FALSE POSITIVES
Status:
- **CONFIRMED** - tier A or B evidence shows the failure or exploit path.
- **LIKELY** - tier C evidence.
- **NOT VERIFIED** - depends on runtime state, settings or versions that could not be checked (tier D). Never present tier D as confirmed.
- **NOT APPLICABLE** - the component or pattern is not used.
- **CONTROLLED** - the risk exists but another control contains it.
- **HARDENING** - improvement without a current failure path (P4).
False-positive rules:
- `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run` is not a vulnerability by itself; it becomes one when the privileged job checks out, executes or interpolates untrusted content.
- An action pinned to a tag instead of a commit SHA is HARDENING unless the action is high-privilege or its publisher is not trusted.
- Secrets referenced in a workflow are not exposed if no job reachable from untrusted triggers receives them.
- `${{ }}` expressions over trusted values (repository constants, `github.sha`, workflow inputs restricted to maintainers) are not injection points.
- Workflows in forks run with fork-scoped permissions; do not report them as affecting the base repository unless a trigger crosses that boundary.
- Branch protection, environment rules and organization settings are outside the repository; mark dependent findings **NOT VERIFIED** when they cannot be checked.
Do not report a missing best practice as a confirmed defect unless there is a concrete failure, exploit, correctness, reliability, or operational path.
## 103. SEVERITY
P0:
- untrusted PR code -> production signing/deploy/admin credential -> arbitrary production control
P1:
- expression injection in a privileged workflow
- artifact poisoning -> privileged execution
- self-hosted runner untrusted code -> internal network or secret compromise
- overbroad OIDC trust policy grants production cloud roles
P2:
- excessive `GITHUB_TOKEN` or secret scope reachable only by trusted triggers
- cache poisoning or third-party action risk without a confirmed privileged consumer
- deployment paths that bypass intended approvals for non-production environments
P3:
- limited weaknesses with narrow impact (noisy logs, minor permission excess)
P4:
- hardening without a current exploit path
## 104. OUTPUT
`GITHUB_ACTIONS_FORENSIC_AUDIT.md`
## 105. MATRICES
### Workflow Matrix
| Workflow | Trigger | Token permissions | Secrets | Deploy |
|---|---|---|---|---|
### External Action Matrix
| Action | Ref | Third-party | Secrets | Write perms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
### Trust Matrix
| Trigger | Untrusted code | Secrets | Write token | Runner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
## 106. SECOND PASS
Mandatorily test or analyze:
- malicious PR modifies package script
- PR title shell characters
- pull_request_target checkout
- workflow_run poisoned artifact
- third-party action compromise assumption
- self-hosted runner persistence
- rerun privileged workflow
- arbitrary dispatch input
- OIDC branch/subject manipulation
- production deploy concurrency
## 107. FINAL QUALITY GATE
Verify:
- all workflows
- all triggers
- effective permissions
- secrets per job
- untrusted inputs
- third-party refs
- reusable workflows
- artifacts/caches
- self-hosted runners
- OIDC
- release signing
- package publish
- production deploy
- rerun/idempotency
# FINAL RULE
I do not want:
> Pin actions and reduce permissions.
I am seeking:
```text
trigger:
pull_request_target
↓
job has:
contents: write
production token
↓
checkout:
ref = pull_request.head.sha
↓
npm install
↓
PR author modifies postinstall
↓
attacker code executes with production secret
```
or:
```text
untrusted PR workflow
↓
uploads build artifact
↓
workflow_run triggers privileged release job
↓
release job downloads artifact
↓
executes included script
↓
production signing key exposed
```
If the workflow is not production-relevant:
adjust severity accordingly.
If the issue represents only a best-practice improvement:
**P4 - HARDENING.**可替换内容
- {{ github.event.issue.title }}
- {{ }}
分类与标签
编程开发、持续集成安全、供应链安全、工作流权限、密钥管理、部署授权